INTRODUCTION
Attention on the big business groups (conglomerates) in Indonesia increased since the cronyism economy in the Soeharto 1 new order. A small number of Chinese Indonesian conglomerates such as Salim Group (Dieleman and Sachs, 2008) collaborated with Soeharto's family business groups dominated business resulted from privileges 2 that they received. These privileges, such as licenses to create monopolies (Mobarak and Purbasari, 2006) , led them to control the overall country's economy which could be seen on market capitalization and gross national product (Claessens et al, 2000; Fisman, 2001) .
Nowadays, the political power in Indonesia disperses. The constitution reform leads to legislative heavy since parliament authorities become larger. Parliament has initiative right to propose draft of laws and has authority to conduct fit and proper test for prospective members of state commissions and officials of state institutions such as governor and deputy governors of central bank and members of supreme audit council (Nys et al., 2015) . It also implies that the country becomes more democratic and deregulated, to some extent (Mursitama, 2006) . However, the ties between business groups and who possess the political power still exist. A number of owners of business groups even directly involve in the political system through political parties. Major public opinion argues that the involvement of business groups' owners in the political area is to secure their business and to seek other benefits such as access of funding to their firms.
In this present paper, we will empirically investigate the impact of being a member of business group, especially with regard to financial performance. Khanna and Yafeh (2007) argue that business groups in emerging market sometimes can be "paragons" but at other times can be "parasites" depending on the economic conditions. We therefore argue that in Indonesia where the market is not efficient, affiliation with a large business group could improve performance, more so if the ultimate owner of the group is involved in the political circumstances.
We categorize 10 large business groups in Indonesian capital market including Astra Group, Bakrie Group, Ciputra Group, Ex Astra Group, Lippo Group, Panin Group, Salim Group, Sinarmas Group, and MNC/ Tanoesoedibyo Group). However, in this empirical model, we exclude 2 groups which are Panin Group due to all of their members are financial firms which are excluded in our sample. The other group is Government Group (State-owned enterprises/ SOEs). However, SOEs are still included in the model as a control variable.
RESEARCH METHOD
We study the impact of being member of business group on firm performance by studying Indonesian 245 publicly-traded firms over the period of [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] . We end up with 1,129 observations (firm-year).
Data to identify the members of business groups are retrieved from our database, while financial accounting data are collected from financial and annual reports.
We use a dummy variable (BUS_GROUP) taking a value of 1 for those affiliated with business groups and 0 otherwise. Going deeper, we also break down in details.
Therefore, we create a vector of dummy variables to represent each business group (Astra, Bakrie, Ciputra, Lippo, Salim, Sinarmas, MNC). Ex Astra Group is used as benchmark. Our dependent variable which is financial performance is proxied by the return on assets (ROA) and the return on equity (ROE) presented as percentage. We take into account some control variables. First, we include the firm size which is measured by the natural logarithm of total assets (LNTA). Second, the ratio of debt to total assets is accounted to represent the leverage (LEV). Firm age (AGE) which is the difference between date of incorporation and this study is also included. Finally, as mentioned earlier, we control for state-owned enterprises (SOE) which is a dummy variable.
The empirical models to be estimated using ordinary least square (OLS) are presented as follows:
ROAi,t = α0 + α1BUS_GROUPi,t + α2LNTAi,t+ α3LEVi,t + α4AGEi,t + α5SOEi + εi,t ………… (1)

ROEi,t = α0 + α1BUS_GROUPi,t + α2LNTAi,t+ α3LEVi,t + α4AGEi,t + α5SOEi + εi,t ………… (2)
ROAi,t = α0 + α1ASTRAi,t + α2BAKRIEi,t + α3CIPUTRAi,t + α4LIPPOi,t + α5SALIMi,t + α6SINARMASi,t + α7MNCi,t + α8LNTAi,t+ α9LEVi,t + α10AGEi,t + α11SOEi + εi,t …….. (3)
ROEi,t = α0 + α1ASTRAi,t + α2BAKRIEi,t + α3CIPUTRAi,t + α4LIPPOi,t + α5SALIMi,t + α6SINARMASi,t + α7MNCi,t + α8LNTAi,t+ α9LEVi,t + α10AGEi,t + α11SOEi + εi,t …….. (4)
We estimate the empirical models using panel data regressions. However, as some variables are time-invariant, we could not be able to control for individual fixed effect. We only include time effect (dummy variables for each year). Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of variables, while Table 2 exhibits the statistics of variables of each business group. The number of affiliated firms with business groups is 13% of our sample. The average ROA and ROE is 5.26 % and 8.18 %, respectively. The mean of natural logarithm of total assets and leverage ratio is 20.46 and 50.5%. The average firm age is 25.32 years. 4.3% of our sample is state-owned enterprises. Table 3 shows the correlation matrix of variables. We only find small positive correlation between business group and performance. Significant correlations are found between performance and firm size. The dummy variable of state-owned enterprise is significantly and positively correlated with firm performance. Table 4 exhibits the regression results. Our variable of interest which is affiliation with business group does not have significant effect on performance neither ROA nor ROE. However, as shown in Table 5 , some of business groups are significantly associated with financial performance. Those belong to Astra group have higher performance than others. Affiliation with Salim Group also brings positive effect on performance. Our result also provides evidence that firms affiliated with Bakrie Group significantly have lower performance than other firms. Our findings could be interpreted that belonging to a business group not always improves performance. On the one hand, it may help firms to easily obtain sources of funding. However, on the other hand, belong to business group could also lower performance as one might argue that expropriation is more likely incurred in a business group rather than in an independent firm. Overall R-squared 0.056 0.051 The values in parentheses are t-statistics. *, ** and ***indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
RESULTS
Results of our control variables confirm the findings of Prabowo et al. (2014) that state-owned enterprises in Indonesia have higher performance than privately-owned firms. They may have higher market power and subsequently improve performance. We also document that large and long-established firms have higher performance than small and young firms. Leverage is found to be negatively associated with performance.
Robustness Checks
To check consistency of our results, we perform some robustness checks. First, we include dummy variables to account industry differences following the work of Prabowo et al. (2014) . The regression results of our main variable are consistent. Second, we estimate the empirical models using two-step GMM (dynamic panel) to account for endogeneity. The effect of business group on performance is almost the same with those resulted from pooled regressions. Overall R-squared 0.056 0.051 The values in parentheses are t-statistics. *, ** and ***indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
CONCLUSION
To our knowledge, no empirical paper specifically examines impact being affiliated firms with business group on performance in the context of Indonesia. This paper provides policy implications even though only little evidence is found. The affiliation with business group might improve the access to finance and ultimately performance of affiliated firms. However, as mentioned by Kali and Sarkar (2011) the diversification strategy of business groups might be intended to facilitate expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling insiders through tunneling. Strong governance mechanism to mitigate the expropriation of majority shareholders in the business group to minority is strongly needed.
In addition, our comprehensive business group performance index could be beneficial for the regulator particularly the Indonesia Financial Authority Services (Otoritas Jasa Keuangan/ OJK) which is preparing to create an integrative supervision system for business groups (conglomerates). The integrative supervision for business groups can ease the regulator to monitor and maintain the financial stability.
